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	74

. , μ μ
μ μ . μ
μ , μ
μ μ μ μ
μ μ . μ μ μ μ

, , Pecking order , μ
 μ μ μ μ

- : , μ , μ -
 μ μ (panel data)

1.

1.1 μ

μ , μ . μ -
 μ , μ μ -
 μ μ . μ μ μ -
 μ μ μ μ μ -
 μ , μ μ -
 μ , μ μ μ -
 μ μ μ μ .

1.2 μ

μ (- - -)
 2000-2008.
 μ μ μ μ
 μ μ μ (panel data). μ μ
 378
 μ 166 , 112 , 70
 30 . μ
 μ , , $\mu\mu$,
 μ μ μ
 μ , μ μ .

μ μ μ , μ 1980, μμ μ
 μ , μ μ
 μ . μ μ
 μ , μ (Dimitrov &
 Jain, 2008; Caskey & Hughes, 2010), μ (Penman et.
 al., 2007), - μ
 (Korteweg, 2004) (Gomes Schmid, 2010,
 George Hwang, 2010, Garlappi & Yan, 2011),
 μ μ , .
 , μμ :)
 μ μ)
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 , μ μ μ , μ
 , μ
 μ (:). Sivaprasad & Muradoglu (2010),
 μ . , μ μ
 « » ,
 μ μ , μ μ ()
 μ μ μ μ , μ
 , μ ,
 μ - ,
 μ μ (Drobetz & Pensa, 2007).¹ , μ μ
 μ , μ μ
 , : μ μ
 μ μ μ μ μ
 (Bancel & Mittoo 2004).²
 μ ,
 μ .³
 Antoniou et. al. (2008) μ

¹ the arm's length system of USA and UK vs. the control-based system of Continental Europe (Drobetz & Pensa, 2007).
² the maximization of shareholders vs. the maximization of all stakeholders objective (Bancel & Mittoo, 2004).
³ Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009; Oztekin, 2009; Brounen et. al., 2006; Andritzky, 2003; Alves & Ferreira, 2011.

(capital market oriented economies)
(bank oriented economies),
Jong et. al. (2008)
Antoniou et. al. (2008), Alves & Ferreira (2011), Mclean, Zhang & Zhao (2012),
(code law),
(common law).
10

μ , μ ,
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 μ , μ
 , μ μ μ μ ,
 μ μ , μ
 , μ μ
 , μ
 , μ μ
 .
 μμ , μ μ μ
 μ μ μ .
 μ μ , μ μ
 , μ μ .

Modigliani-Miller
 trade-off (Bradley-Jarell-Kim, 1984), pecking order (Myers & Majiluf, 1984), signaling (Ross, 1977) market timing (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), (Baker & Wurgler, 2002).
 -managers

2.2

2.2.1 μ Modigliani-Miller (1958)

Modigliani-Miller μ μ ()
 μ)
 μ .
 Modigliani-Miller μ μ
 ‘ , μ
 μ . μ
 , , μ ,
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 μ .
 , Modigliani-Miller
 . μ μ
 , μ μ ,
 μ . μ μ
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 μ , μ ,
 μ μ , μ ,
 μ μ .
 , Modigliani-Miller
 μ , μ μ μ .
 μ Modigliani-
 Miller :
 1 Modigliani-Miller managers
 μ μ
 μ .
 μ μ
 μ . V μ

(equity) μ , D μ (debt) μ Modigliani-Miller V
 μ μ 1 D , μ μ
 Modigliani-Miller μ μ 1 Modigliani-Miller
 (μ μ μ)
 2 Modigliani-Miller 1
 (cost of equity), μ ,
 D/E .
 μ ' / ' , μ
 μ μ . μ
 μ
 (r_A) μ (r_D) $(r_E = r_A + (r_A - r_D)D/E)$.
 2
 ' , μ μ ' , μ μ
 μ (r_A) μ μ
 ' , μ
 (r_A) (Myers, 2001).
 Modigliani-Miller 1963 μ ,
 μ , μ
 μ μ μ .
 μ μ
 μ
 μ .
 μ , μ
 μ ,
 μ μ ,
 μ μ ,

μ , μ
 μ .

2.2.2 Trade-off

trade-off

μ μ
 μ : i) (taxes), ii) μ μ (costs of
financial distress) iii) μ μ μ -managers
 μ - (agency costs).

trade-off

$\mu\mu$

μ pecking-order theory (Baker Wurgler, 2002).

μ μ trade-off

μ , μ μ μ μ μ

μ .

μ μ

μ μ

μ μ μ

μ

μ μ .

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μ μ μ (μ μ)

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 (μ , μ),
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 , μ μ μ μ
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μ . μ
 $\mu\mu$ μ μ , μ μ
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 μ . μ ,
 μ μ ,
 μ μ μ μ
 μ μ μ .
 μ μ μ μ μ .
 μ μ μ μ ,
 μ . μ μ
: i) μ μ ii)
 μ . μ μ
 μ μ μ μ
 μ μ ,
 μ .
 μ μ
. μ μ
: μ μ
 μ μ (μ ,
) μ μ
 μ . μ μ
 μ μ μ μ
 μ μ μ μ
 μ
 μ μ μ μ
 μ μ μ
. μ trade-off
 μ , μ μ
 μ μ . μ μ trade-off ,

μ μ μ μ μ .

iii) -

μ μ μ μ trade-off

μ μ μ μ -

(Titman Wessels, 1988), μ μ -

μ μ μ μ , μ -

μ μ μ μ μ μ -

μ μ μ μ μ -

μ μ μ μ μ -

μ μ μ μ μ -

μ μ μ μ μ -

iv) -

trade-off μ μ

μ () (growth

opportunities). Jensen & Meckling (1976) Myers (1977) -

, managers -

μ $\mu\mu$ μ μ -

() μ μ . -

μ μ μ μ , trade-

off μ μ -

μ μ , μ -

μ μ μ μ -

μ μ μ μ -

μ μ μ μ -

μ μ μ μ -

μ μ μ μ -

v)

-

μ μ μ μ -
 μ (μ) -
 . trade-off μ -
 μ (' μ ') . -
 μ -
 μ μ . μ -
 μ μ μ . -
 trade-off μ ' μ ' (-
 μ) μ . -

vi)

-

μ μ μ

 trade-off -
 μ , μ ,
 μ μ μ
 . , μ
 μ . . μ μ -
 μ μ μ . μ -
 μ μ trade-off μ μ
 μ ' ,
 μ μ μ .

vii)

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μ μ μ

μ μ trade-off , -
 μ μ μ μ μ
 μ μ μ , μ μ -
 μ . μ μ
 μ μ μ . μ μ trade-off
 μ μ μ μ .

i) μ ()

) μ (μ -)

($-\mu$), μ μ -

μ μ .

μ , managers

μ μ μ

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μ μ μ μ .

μ μ ()

μ μ μ μ ,

μ μ , -

μ μ μ , -

μ μ μ μ -

μ μ .

μ μ

(asset substitution problem)

μ .

μ μ μ μ μ -

premium

μ μ μ .

μ μ -

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μ μ μ -

μ μ μ -

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ii)

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iii)

μ

μ (free cash flow theory)

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μ μ μ μ μ managers. -

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- managers,

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Jensen,

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μ , μ μ μ μ -
 managers. , μ μ -
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 μ μ μ μ
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 . μ μ μ μ
 . μ μ μ μ

i)

–

μ μ , μ -
 μ μ , -
 managers μ μ μ
 managers μ μ μ . μ
 μ μ μ μ μ -
 μ μ .

ii)

–

managers μ μ -
 (μ , perks, bonuses .)
 , μ μ
 . managers μ μ
 μ μ -
 , -
 . μ
 , μ
 μ managers μ
 μ . -
 μ μ , μ μ -
 μ μ
 μ .

iii)

–

μ μ μ μ . -
 μ

- vi) — μ μ μ
- μ μ μ , μ -
- vii) — μ μ μ
- μ μ μ
- μ μ μ
- μ μ μ
- μ μ μ
- μ μ μ
- μ μ μ
- μ μ μ
- μ μ μ
- μ μ μ
- μ μ μ
- μ μ μ

2.2.4 Pecking order

pecking order -

Myers & Majluf (1984) μ trade-off -

μ managers μ -

μ μ , μ managers -

μ μ , μ , -

μ μ , μ , -

managers μ μ -

μ μ -
 μ .
managers μ μ μ $\mu\mu$ μ
managers. μ μ μ -
 μ μ $\mu\mu$ μ
- , μ μ managers μ -
 μ μ μ μ μ
 μ μ .
pecking order
 μ , μ μ
 $\mu\mu$, μ -
, μ μ
 μ μ μ μ μ (trade-off -
).
 μ pecking order -
 μ
 μ μ , μ managers
 μ μ , μ .
 μ μ μ
 μ . , μ -
 μ , μ -
 μ .
(μ) .
 μ .
 μ μ pecking-order -
 μ μ -
 μ . μ μ -
 μ μ
 μ μ

(debt capacity) -

μ , . μ

μ μ ,

μ . μ μ μ

μ μ μ μ μ μ μ

μ μ μ μ μ μ μ

Shyam-Sunder Myers (1999) pecking-order

μ μ μ

μ

μ (trade-off).

pecking order managers

μ μ μ -

, μ μ -

- μ μ

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μ .

pecking order -

μ μ μ

μ μ μ μ μ -

μ μ -

.

pecking order

i) -

pecking order -

μ μ μ -

μ μ μ μ μ

μ . μ μ μ

μ . μ μ μ $\mu\mu$ -
 μ μ μ μ μ μ -
 μ μ μ μ μ μ -
 μ μ μ , pecking order
 μ μ μ .
 μ μ μ (Harris Raviv, (1991), Rajan
 Zingales (1995)).
 μ μ μ , μ μ
 μ μ , μ μ
 .

ii)

-
 pecking order μ
 μ μ μ μ μ μ -
 μ μ μ μ μ -
 μ μ μ μ μ -
 μ , μ μ μ μ μ -
 μ μ μ $\mu\mu$
 μ μ , μ
 μ μ μ
 (Harris & Raviv (1991)).

iii)

-
 μ μ μ μ μ μ
 $\mu\mu$ μ μ μ μ μ -
 [Rajan & Zingales (1995)]. μ μ μ μ
 μ μ μ μ μ
 μ μ μ μ μ μ μ -
 μ μ $\mu\mu$

μ μ . ,
pecking order μ μ
μ .

iv) -

μ pecking order μ μ . μ μ
pecking order μ -
μ . μ
μ μ μ -
μ μ μ -
μ μ μ
μ μ μ pecking order μ
μ μ μ
μ μ μ μ μ
μ μ μ μ μ
(debt capacity)
μ μ μ μ μ
μ μ μ μ μ pecking
order μ
μ μ μ μ μ
μ μ μ μ μ
μ μ μ μ μ μ

v) -

pecking order
(CAPEX) & μ μ

μ , financial deficit
 . μ μ pecking order μ μ -
 μ μ μ .

vi) - μ μ μ
 pecking order μ
 ‘ , μ
 μ μ ,
 μ μ .

vii) - μ μ μ
 pecking order
 μ μ , μ μ -
 () μ
 μ μ μ . μ ,
 μ μ ‘ , μ ,
 μ μ μ μ , μ
 () μ (Fama & French, 2002).
 , -
 μ μ μ . μ μ
 pecking order μ μ -
 , μ μ μ
 μ μ μ μ μ .

2.3

2.3.1 Market timing

Baker & Wurgler 2002 market timing
 μ -

(trade-off pecking order) -
 . μ μ managers
 .
 μ
 .
 μ μ . μ
 managers
 μ , μ μ
 managers μ μ
 .
 μ μ μ -
 μ μ managers
 μ
 μ (Baker & Wurgler 2002).
 μ Market to Book
 (M/B) μ μ
 μ / μ
 .
 μ -
 μ -
 μ μ μ -
 μ μ -
 μ μ
 μ μ
 μ μ
 μ μ trade-off pecking
 order /
 μ . -
 μ -
 (10), μ -
 μ μ
 μ .
 Baker & Wurgler μ μ -
 market timing , μ -

μ μ () μ μ : μ -
 μ μ μ , μ μ -
 μ μ μ μ μ μ -
 (Graham Harvey, 2001).

2.3.2 μ (Signaling theory)

μ μ signaling ,
 μ μ ,
 , μ managers
 . Ross (1977)
 pecking order , signaling
 μμ . managers μ -
 μ
 μ .
 μ μ μ μ μ
 . μ μ μ μ μ
 μ μ μ μ μ , μ -
 μ μ μ μ μ . μ -
 μ μ μ μ μ μ
 μ .
 μ μ μ (signaling theory), μ
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 μ . μ μ μ μ μ
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 μ () μ
 μ μ μ .
 μ μ μ -
 μ . μ -

μ μ μ . -
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 , μ -
 . , μ
 μ μ μ μ μ
 , μ
 μ μ μ μ μ -
 μ μ .
 , μ μ
 , μ μ -
 μ μ , -
 . -
 μ μ μ μ -
 , μ μ μ μ μ μ -
 μ . μ μ , Ross (1977) -
 μ μ
 μ μ μ .

3.

3.1

Bradley et al., 1984 (trade-off theory) Myers & Majluf, 1984 (pecking order theory)
Jensen & Meckling, 1976 (agency cost theory).

Myers & Majluf (1984) argued that firms with high growth opportunities should use debt financing to avoid the agency costs of equity financing. This is because debt financing is less likely to be used for the firm's private inclusions, such as excessive perquisites and empire building, which are common in equity-financed firms. Therefore, firms with high growth opportunities should use debt financing to avoid the agency costs of equity financing.

Rajan & Zingales (1995) found that the average debt-to-capitalization ratio for U.S. firms is approximately 30%-70%. This is significantly higher than the average debt-to-capitalization ratio for Japanese firms, which is approximately 50%.

Myers (1984) argued that firms with high growth opportunities should use debt financing to avoid the agency costs of equity financing. This is because debt financing is less likely to be used for the firm's private inclusions, such as excessive perquisites and empire building, which are common in equity-financed firms. Therefore, firms with high growth opportunities should use debt financing to avoid the agency costs of equity financing.

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G7 μ μ μ μ

2002 Fama & French μ μ

μ trade-off μ μ μ ,

μ μ 3000 μ

Compustat.

μ μ μ

μ μ μ

μ μ ,

μ μ μ .

μ μ μ μ μ μ

μ μ μ μ μ μ

μ Fama & French

trade-off μ μ

μ μ μ μ

μ μ μ ,

Drobetz & Fix (2003) μ μ 124 μ

order μ trade-off μ pecking

Zingales (1995). μ μ μ μ Rajan &

data, μ μ μ μ panel

μ , μ .

μ

trade- off μ μ

Shyam-Shuder & Myers (1999) . . Rajan & Zingales (1995)

μ G7. μ

μ μ trade-off

μ μ
 pecking order μ trade-off.
 Chen (2004) 77
 μ . μ μ μ
 μ panel data. μ μ
 μ (μ μ μ /)
 , μ , , μ
 , μ μ , μ
 μ μ
 .
 Chen μ μ
 . , μ
 μ μ μ μ
 Chen μ
 μ μ μ μ .
 μ μ (μ) ,
 μ μ μ μ .
 pecking order
 μ .
 trade-off μ μ
 μ .
 2006 Flanery & Rangan
 Kayhan & Titman 2007 μ
 μ μ μ μ .
3.2 μ μ μ
 (μ)
 μ
 ,
 μ μ . μ μ μ
 μ pecking order .

μ , Titman & Wessels (1988) μ
 , μ
 μ μ μ
 . , Cassa & Holmes (2003) & Hall et al. (2004)
 μ μ μ
 μ .
 Kester (1986) μ μ
 μ , μ Rajan &
 Zingales (1995). μ μ Fama & French (1998),
 , μ μ μ
 μ μ μ ,
 μ . Graham (2000)
 μ μ
 . μ μ Mohammad Fawzi & Jaafer
 Maroof (2012) μ ,
 μ μ μ ROE,
 μ μ μ . μ
 μ μ μ μ μ
 , μ μ
 .
 μ , Amibu (2007) μ μ
 μ μ μ
 . ,
 μ μ μ
 μ μ μ

3.3 μ μ μ (μ)

order μ , μ . μ pecking
 μ μ μ , Petersen & Rajan (1994) μ
 μ μ μ , Ooi (1999)

μ μ μ .
 μ μ μ Scherr et al. (1993)
 μ μ μ μ μ
 μ μ μ Taub (1975),
 μ μ μ μ μ μ
 μ μ μ μ μ μ
Champion (1999) Leibenstein (1966), μ

μ
 μ μ
managers .
 μ , μ
 μ μ μ μ μ
 μ .
 μ μ
 μ , Abor (2005) μ μ μ
 μ μ μ μ
 μ μ μ μ μ μ
 μ , Abor (2005) μ
 μ μ

μ . μ ,
 μ ,
 μ μ μ (Hutchinson, 1995).
 μ μ μ μ
 μ μ . μ μ μ ,
 μ μ μ μ μ ,
 μ . , μ μ μ ,
 μ μ μ .

$S^2 = \frac{\sum u_i^2}{n-k}$

$R^2 = 1 - \frac{\sum u_i^2}{\sum (y_i - \bar{y})^2}$

$0 < R^2 < 1$

$R_{adj}^2 = 1 - \frac{(n-1) \sum u_i^2}{\sum (y_i - \bar{y})^2}$

$F = \frac{\sum u_i^2 / k}{\sum (y_i - \bar{y})^2 / (n-k)}$

$F_{1-\alpha, k, n-k}$

μ

$$t\text{-statistic} = \frac{\mu - \mu_0}{\frac{s}{\sqrt{n}}}$$

where μ is the sample mean, μ_0 is the population mean, s is the sample standard deviation, and n is the sample size.

The probability of a Type I error is denoted by α . In this case, $\alpha = 0,05$.

The null hypothesis H_0 is $\mu = \mu_0$, and the alternative hypothesis H_1 is $\mu \neq \mu_0$.

The test is two-tailed, so the critical values are $\pm t_{\alpha/2, n-1}$.

The decision rule is: reject H_0 if $|t\text{-statistic}| > t_{\alpha/2, n-1}$.

4.2.1

$$ROE_t = b_0 + b_1 (LEVERAGE)_t + b_2 (BE_ME)_t + b_3 (MARKET_CAP)_t + b_4 (P_E)_t + u_t$$

- ROE:
- LEVERAGE: μ μ
- BE_ME:
- MARKET_CAP: μ
- P_E: μ μ μ

- **ROE = EAT / EQUIT:** $\mu \quad \mu \quad \mu$
 $\mu \quad \mu \quad \mu$
 $\mu \quad \mu \quad \mu$
 $\mu \quad \mu \quad \mu$, EBIT / EQUITI (Abor, 2005), μ
 μ

- **LEVERAGE = DEBT / EQUITY:** $\mu \quad \mu \quad \mu$
 μ , μ

- **BE_ME (BOOK-TO- MARKET RATIO) = BOOK VALUE OF EQUITY/ MARKET VALUE OF EQUITY:**

$$\frac{\mu}{\mu} = \frac{\mu}{\mu}$$

- **MARKET_CAP (MARKET CAPITALIZATION) = NUMBER OF COMMON SHARES * MARKET VALUE PER PRICE:**

$$\mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu$$

- **P_E = SHARE PRICE/EARNINGS PER SHARE:**

$$\mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu$$

panel data.

$$\mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu$$

$$\mu \mu \quad (\mu \quad \mu) \mu \quad , \quad -$$

$$\mu \quad 2 \quad \mu \quad -$$

$$\mu \quad \mu \quad -$$

$$R^2 = \frac{\text{ESS}}{\text{TSS}}$$

$$t = \frac{\beta_1}{\text{SE}(\beta_1)}$$

$$d = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (e_t - e_{t-1})^2}{\sum_{i=1}^n e_t^2} \quad 0 < d < 4$$

Durbin-Watson,

Durbin-Watson

White test

panel

μ . μ (unit root tests). μ -
 μ μ μ μ
 μ .
 μ : $Y_{it} = a_i Y_{it-1} + \epsilon_{it}$ μ $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$ $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$
 μ $a_i < 1$, μ , $a_i = 1$, -
 μ . μ
 μ $a_i = a$ $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$, μ -
 μ μ (common unit root processes).
 Levin-Lin-Chu (2002), Breitung (2000) Handri (2000).
 μ LLC, μ
 t_{LLC} . LLC μ μ
 μ μ μ t_{LLC} μ
 μ Z.

4.2.2 Panel Data

μ panel data,
 μ μ μ μ μ μ -
 μ .
 μ : $Y_{it} = \mu + N \mu_{it} + \mu_i + \mu_t + \epsilon_{it}$
 $Y_{it} = \mu + \mu$ i μ t
 $=$
 $N_{it} = N$ μ i μ t
 $\mu_i = \mu$ μ μ μ
 $\mu_t = \mu$ μ μ
 $\mu_{it} = \mu$ μ
 μ μ μ
 μ_i t μ -
 μ_i t μ . -
 μ μ Fixed Effects Model, μ
 μ Random Effects Model.

Fixed Effects Model.

Random Effects Model.

Fixed Effects Model (Chen, 2004).
 Abor (2005).

4.2.3

Basset (1978) Koenker
 Koenker R., Kevin F. Hallock G.Bassett.
 Eviews 6.0 (0,05, 0,25, 0,75, 0,95). 0,5

4.3 μ - μ

μ , μ , μ ,
 2000-2008.
 μ Bloomberg.
 μ 12 ,
 . . , . .
 μ μ . μ μ
 μ , μ
 μ μ μ
 . μ μ
 2000-2008. μ μ
 μ μ 378
 μ , μ 166 , ,
 70 μ 30 .
 μ μ
 EXCEL -
 μ μ Eviews 6.0 μ
 μ .
 μ μ . μ
 μ μ (mean), μ (median),
 (standard deviation), μ (maximum) μ (minimum)
 μ μ μ 2000-2008
 μ ,

1: 2000-2008

2000-2008	ROE	LEVERAGE	BE_ME	MARKET_CAP	P_E
MEAN	4,6672	28,232	1,0928	1674,7	0,2014

MEDIAN	7,4432	28,699	0,6547	131,16	9,2398
MAX	147,20	1202,1	526,32	10607,1	24214,3
MIN	-833,5	0	0,0006	1,1189	-31454,3
STD. DEV	31,891	26,385	9,338	6928,9	1286,2
OBS.	3218	3218	3218	3218	3218

2:

2000-2008

2000-2008	ROE	LEVERAGE	BE_ME	MARKET_CAP	P_E
MEAN	5,2190	27,144	1,0390	261,95	-19,205
MEDIAN	5,7935	28,341	0,7206	55,980	9,6853
MAX	140,03	92,432	16,696	12351,8	16365
MIN	-227,35	0	0,0006	1,1189	-31454
STD. DEV	22,860	17,475	1,6908	865,88	1656,8
OBS.	1400	1400	1400	1400	1400

3:

2000-2008

2000-2008	ROE	LEVERAGE	BE_ME	MARKET_CAP	P_E
MEAN	0,2879	26,520	1,4966	2598,9	-10,209
MEDIAN	6,6740	27,162	0,6463	222,82	6,8763
MAX	118,05	74,600	526,31	102056	6275,9
MIN	-833,56	0,0061	0,0062	4,8990	-28787
STD. DEV	40,242	14,489	17,070	9230,7	966,99
OBS.	955	955	955	955	955

4:

2000-2008

2000-2008	ROE	LEVERAGE	BE_ME	MARKET_CAP	P_E
MEAN	12,611	28,301	0,6525	3694,1	17,171
MEDIAN	12,617	26,624	0,5433	530,98	11,417
MAX	147,20	1202,1	3,5574	106067	527,23
MIN	-196,05	0,0089	0,0041	19,890	-380,38
STD. DEV	21,502	49,778	0,4524	10253	52,793
OBS.	614	614	614	614	614

5:

2000-2008

2000-2008	ROE	LEVERAGE	BE_ME	MARKET_CAP	P_E
MEAN	-1,2292	40,743	0,9317	1094,2	107,39
MEDIAN	6,7802	41,343	0,7409	126,00	7,1183

MAX	99.368	75,158	5,6085	11705	24214.2
MIN	-330.11	1,3250	0,0320	4,7775	-145.81
STD. DEV	51.047	14,166	0,8698	2432,6	1534.3
OBS.	249	249	249	249	249

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6: μ μ

	ROE	LEVERAGE	BE_ME	MARKET_CAP	P_E
ROE	1,0000	-0,1032	0,0021	0,1040	0,0043
LEVERAGE	-0,1032	1,0000	-0,0013	0,0383	0,0322
BE_ME	-0,0041	-0,0013	1,0000	0,0045	0,0021
MARKET_CAP	0,1040	0,0383	0,0045	1,0000	-0,0218
P_E	0,0043	0,0322	0,0021	-0,0218	1,0000

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7: μ μ

	ROE	LEVERAGE	BE_ME	MARKET_CAP	P_E
ROE	1,0000	-0,2358	-0,1946	0,1314	0,0076
LEVERAGE	-0,2358	1,0000	0,0120	0,0344	0,0760

BE_ME	-0,1946	0,0120	1,0000	-0,1325	0,0243
MARKET_CAP	0,1314	0,0344	-0,1325	1,0000	0,0065
P_E	0,0076	0,0760	0,0243	0,0065	1,0000

7: μ μ

	ROE	LEVERAGE	BE_ME	MARKET_CAP	P_E
ROE	1,0000	-0,1411	0,0136	0,1030	0,0040
LEVERAGE	-0,1411	1,0000	-0,0025	0,0662	-0,0329
BE_ME	0,0136	-0,0025	1,0000	0,0126	0,0015
MARKET_CAP	0,1030	0,0662	0,0126	1,0000	-0,0753
P_E	0,0040	-0,0329	0,0015	-0,0753	1,0000

8: μ μ

	ROE	LEVERAGE	BE_ME	MARKET_CAP	P_E
ROE	1,0000	-0,0552	-0,3158	0,1700	-0,0054
LEVERAGE	-0,0552	1,0000	0,0160	0,0453	-0,0202
BE_ME	-0,3158	0,0160	1,0000	-0,2092	0,0758
MARKET_CAP	0,1700	0,0453	-0,2092	1,0000	-0,0302
P_E	-0,0054	-0,0202	0,0758	-0,0302	1,0000

9: μ μ

	ROE	LEVERAGE	BE_ME	MARKET_CAP	P_E
ROE	1,0000	-0,1176	-0,0047	0,1659	0,0036
LEVERAGE	-0,1176	1,0000	0,0151	0,0318	0,0972
BE_ME	-0,0047	0,0151	1,0000	-0,2097	0,0080
MARKET_CAP	0,1659	0,0318	-0,2097	1,0000	-0,0232
P_E	0,0036	0,0972	0,0080	-0,0232	1,0000

μ μ (unit root tests) μ
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10: μ μ

Unit root (assumes common unit root process)	ROE		LEVER- AGE		BE_ME		MAR- KET_CAP		P_E	
	stat	Prob	stat	Prob	stat	Prob	stat	Prob	stat	Prob
Levin, Lin & Chu	-28.2	0.000	-319.8	0.000	-24.2	0.000	-67.3	0.000	-268	0.000
5%										

11: μ μ

Unit root (assumes common unit root process)	ROE		LEVER- AGE		BE_ME		MAR- KET_CAP		P_E	
	stat	Prob	stat	Prob	stat	Prob	stat	Prob	stat	Prob
Levin, Lin & Chu										
	-21,18	0.000	-279,6	0.000	-9,53	0.000	-66,38	0.000	-2665,	0.000
	-18,62	0.000	-9,11	0.000	-1,020	0.000	-12,11	0.000	-118,1	0.000
	-4,36	0.000	-128,8	0.000	-13,80	0.000	-8,99	0.000	-22,85	0.000
-	-13,20	0.000	-5,86	0.000	-20,35	0.000	-1,68	0.000	-19,19	0.000
5%										

5.

5.1

Panel Least Square
 White (cross-section time)

11:

Dependent Variable	ROE				
Method	PanelLeastSquare				
Sample	2000 2008				
Cross-sections	378				
White cross-section standard errors & covariance					
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Stat.	Prob.	
C	7.524824	2.478351	3.036222	0.0024	
LEVERAGE	-0.130196	0.087909	-1.481024	0.01387	
BE_ME	-0.016303	0.031480	-0.517893	0.6046	
MARKET_C AP	0.000499	5.90E-05	8.456599	0.0000	
P_E	0.000252	8.29E-05	3.046694	0.0023	
Effects Specification					
R-squared	0.0224466		Mean dependent var	4.667213	
Adjusted R-squared	0.0215344		S.D dependent var	31.89146	
S.E of regression	31.54623		Akaike info criterion	9.742027	
Sum squared resid	3198458		Schwack criterion	9.749580	
Log likelihood	-15670.92		Hannan-Quinn crit.	9.744734	
F-statistic	24.59941		Durbin-Watson stat	0.878594	
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000				

2000-2008
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 Durbin-Watson stat.
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12:

Dependent Variable	ROE				
Method	PanelLeastSquare				
Sample	2000 2008				
Cross-sections	378				
White cross-section standard errors & covariance					
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Stat.	Prob.	
C	7.506916	2,483481	3,022740	0.0025	
LEVERAGE	-0.130187	0.087889	-1.481257	0.0138	
MARKET_C AP	0.000499	5.91E-05	8.445406	0.0000	

P_E	0.000252	8.28E-05	3.046460	0.0023	
Effects Specification					
R-squared	0.0224466		Mean dependent var	4.667213	
Adjusted R-squared	0.0215344		S.D dependent var	31.89146	
S.E of regression	31.54623		Akaike info criterion	9.742027	
Sum squared resid	3198458		Schwack criterion	9.749580	
Log likelihood	-15670.92		Hannan-Quinn crit.	9.744734	
F-statistic	24.59941		Durbin-Watson stat	0.878594	
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000				

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \\
 & \mu \quad \mu \quad \mu \\
 & \text{MARKET_CAP (Prob. 0.000),} \quad \mu \quad \text{P_E (Prob.} \\
 & \text{0.000)} \quad \mu \quad \text{(LEVERAGE).} \quad \mu \quad \mu \quad : \\
 & \text{ROE} = 7,50 + 0.00049\text{MARKET_CAP} + 0.00025\text{P_E} - 0.0138\text{LEVERAGE} \\
 & (1)
 \end{aligned}$$

13: μ μ

Dependent Variable	ROE				
Method	PanelLeastSquare				
	s				
Sample	2000 2008				
Cross-sections	166				
White cross-section standard errors & covariance					
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Stat.	Prob.	
C	16,54359	1,026028	16,12392	0,00000	
LEVERAGE	-0,313887	0,041752	-7,517840	0,00000	
BE_ME	-3,463629	0,760641	-4,553566	0,00000	
MARKET_C AP	0,003063	0,000386	7,940222	0,00000	
P_E	0,000406	7,35E-05	5.502742	0.00000	

Effects Specification			
R-squared	0.106546	Mean dependent var	5,219048
Adjusted R-squared	0.103984	S.D dependent var	22,86032
S.E of regression	21.63915	Akaike info criterion	8,990451
Sum squared resid	653212.8	Schwack criterion	9,009180
Log likelihood	-6288.315	Hannan-Quinn crit.	8,997452
F-statistic	41.58899	Durbin-Watson stat	1,102041
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000		

13 μ μ ,

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0,104. μ μ μ :

$$ROE_{GR} = 16.54 - 0.3138LEVERAGE - 3.4636BE_ME + 0.0031MARKET_CAP + 0.0004P_E \quad (2)$$

14: μ μ

Dependent Variable	ROE				
Method	PanelLeastSquare				
	s				
Sample	2000 2008				
Cross-sections	112				
White cross-section standard errors & covariance					
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Stat.	Prob.	
C	9,895361	4,933206	2,005868	0,0452	
LEVERAGE	-0,412100	0,218275	-1,887983	0,0593	
BE_ME	0,027780	0,005664	4,904649	0,0000	
MARKET_C	0,000494	7,29E-05	6.236936	0,0000	
AP					
P_E	0.000318	9.65E-05	3.298195	0.0010	
Effects Specification					

Adjusted R-squared	0.108142	S.D dependent var	21.50241
S.E of regression	20.30650	Akaike info criterion	8.864633
Sum squared resid	251948.2	Schwack criterion	8.886229
Log likelihood	-2718.442	Hannan-Quinn crit.	8.873031
F-statistic	38.16458	Durbin-Watson stat	0.582843
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000		

15 μ

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μ LEVERAGE μ Prob. 0,3089. μ μ :

$$ROE_{SP} = 21.85 - 13.93BE_ME + 0,0002MARKET_CAP (4)$$

16: μ μ

Dependent Variable	ROE				
Method	PanelLeastSquare s				
Sample	2000 2008				
Cross-sections	30				
White cross-section standard errors & covariance					
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Stat.	Prob.	
C	13,14591	10,10523	1,300901	0.1945	
LEVERAGE	-0,450602	0.214902	-2.096779	0.0370	
MARKET_C AP	0,003577	0,000424	8,429322	0.0000	
P_E	0,000657	0,000206	3,188111	0.0016	
Effects Specification					
R-squared	0,043080		Mean dependent var	-1,229206	
Adjusted R-squared	0,031362		S.D dependent var	51,04787	
S.E of regression	50,24100		Akaike info criterion	10,68747	
Sum squared resid	6,184187		Schwack criterion	10,74398	

Log likelihood	-1326,590	Hannan-Quinn crit.	10,71022
F-statistic	3,676574	Durbin-Watson stat	1,026635
Prob(F-statistic)	0.012796		

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$$ROE_{PO} = 13.14 - 0.4506LEVERAGE + 0,0035MARKET_CAP + 0.0006P_E$$

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5.2 μ μ

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17: μ μ μ

Variable	Quantile 0.05	Quantile 0.25	Quantile 0.75	Quantile 0.95
C	-1.726582 (-0.98)	5.543003 (1.71)	15.09110 (14.88)	0.000947 (30.83)
LEVERAGE	-0.957027* -7.26)	-0.144461* (-4.98)	-0.032722 (-0.83)	-0.011565* (-9.69)
BE_ME	0.077383*	-1.450527	-0.001050	-0.034821*

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